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Abstract
The paper tackles the issue of checking that all copies of a large data set replicated at several
nodes of a network are identical. The fact that the replicas may be located at distant nodes
prevents the system from verifying their equality locally, i.e., by having each node consult only
nodes in its vicinity. On the other hand, it remains possible to assign certificates to the nodes,
so that verifying the consistency of the replicas can be achieved locally. However, we show that,
as the data set is large, classical certification mechanisms, including distributed Merlin-Arthur
protocols, cannot guarantee good completeness and soundness simultaneously, unless they use
very large certificates. The main result of this paper is a distributed quantum Merlin-Arthur
protocol enabling the nodes to collectively check the consistency of the replicas, based on small
certificates, and in a single round of message exchange between neighbors, with short messages. In
particular, the certificate-size is logarithmic in the size of the data set, which gives an exponential
advantage over classical certification mechanisms.
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1 Introduction
In the context of distributed systems, the presence of faults potentially corrupting the indi-
vidual states of the nodes requires to regularly check whether the system is in a global state
that is legal with respect to its specification. A basic example is a system storing data, and
using replicas in order to support crash failures. In this case, the application managing the
data is in charge of regularly checking that the several replicas of the same data, stored at
different nodes scattered in the network, are all identical. Another example is an application
maintaining a tree spanning the nodes of a network, e.g., for multicast communications. In
this case, every node stores a pointer to its parent in the tree, and the application must
regularly check that the collection of pointers forms a spanning tree. This paper addresses
the issue of checking the correctness of a distributed system configuration at low cost.
Several mechanisms have been designed for certifying the correctness of the global state
of a system in a distributed manner. One popular mechanism is called locally checkable
proof [20], an extension of the seminal concept of proof-labeling schemes [31]. In these
frameworks, the distributed application does not only construct and/or maintain some dis-
tributed data structure (e.g., a spanning tree), but also constructs a distributed proof that
the data structure is correct. This proof has the form of a certificate assigned to each node
(the certificates assigned to different nodes do not need to be the same). For collectively
checking the legality of the current global system state, the nodes exchange their certificates
with their neighbors in the network. Then, based on its own individual state, its certificate,
and the certificates of its neighbors, every node accepts or rejects, according to the following
specification. If the global state is legal, and if the certificates are assigned properly by the
application, then all nodes accept. Conversely, if the global state is illegal, then at least
one node rejects, no matter which certificates are assigned to the nodes. Such a rejecting
node can raise an alarm, or launch a recovery procedure. The main aim of locally checkable
proofs is to be compact, that is, to use certificates as small as possible, for two reasons: first,
limiting the space complexity at each node, and, second, limiting the message complexity of
the verification procedure involving communications between neighbors.
For instance, in the case of a spanning tree, the application does not only construct a
spanning tree T of the network, but also a distributed proof that T is indeed a spanning
tree, i.e., that the collection T of pointers form a cycle-free connected spanning subgraph. It
is known for long [2, 5, 22] that, by assigning to every node a certificate of logarithmic size,
the nodes can collectively check whether T is indeed a spanning tree, in a single round of
communication between neighboring nodes. The certificate assigned to a node is the identity
of the root of the tree, and its distance to this root (both are of logarithmic size as long as
the IDs are in a range polynomial in the number of nodes). Every node just checks that it
is provided with the same root-ID as all its neighbors in the network, and that the distance
given to its parent in its certificate is one less than its own given distance — a node with
distance 0 checks that its ID is indeed the root-ID provided in its certificate. Obviously,
if the collection T of pointers forms a spanning tree, and if the certificates are assigned
properly by the application, then all nodes pass these tests, and accept. On the other hand,
it is easy to check that if T is not a spanning tree (it is not connected, or it contains a cycle),
then at least one node detects it, no matter which certificates are assigned to the nodes.
Unfortunately, not all boolean predicates on labeled graphs can be distributedly certified
using certificates as small as for spanning tree. This is typically the case of the aforemen-
tioned scenario of a distributed data storage using replicas, for which one must certify
equality. Let us for instance consider the case of two nodes Alice and Bob at the two ex-
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tremities of a path, that is, the two players are separated by intermediate nodes. Alice and
Bob respectively store two n-bit strings x and y, and the objective is to certify that x = y.
That is, one wants to certify equality (EQ) between distant players. A direct reduction from
the non-deterministic communication complexity of EQ shows that certifying EQ cannot be
achieved with certificates smaller than Ω(n) bits.
Randomization may help overpassing the difficulty of certifying some boolean predicates
on labeled graphs using small certificates. Hence, a weaker form of protocols has been con-
sidered, namely distributed Merlin-Arthur protocols (dMA), a.k.a. randomized proof-labeling
schemes [18]. In this latter context, Merlin provides the nodes with a proof, just like in
locally checkable proofs, and Arthur performs a randomized local verification at each node.
Unfortunately, some predicates remain hard in this framework too. In particular, as we
shall show in the paper, there are no classical dMA protocols for (distant) EQ using compact
certificates.
1.1 Our Results
We carry on the recent trend of research consisting of investigating the power of quantum
resources in the context of distributed network computing (cf., e.g., [14, 33, 23, 34, 24, 19]),
by designing a distributed Quantum Merlin-Arthur (dQMA) protocol for distant EQ, using
compact certificates and small messages. Specifically, our main result is the following. A
collection of n-bit strings x1, . . . , xt are stored at t terminal nodes u1, . . . , ut in a network
G = (V,E), where node ui stores xi. We denote EQ
t
n the problem of checking the equality
x1 = · · · = xt between the t strings. Let us define the radius of a given instance of EQtn as
r = minimaxj distG(ui, uj), where distG denotes the distance in the (unweighted) graph G.
Our main result is the design of a dQMA protocol for EQtn, using small certificate. This can
be summarized by the following informal statement (the formal statement is in Section 5):
◮ Main Result. There is a distributed Quantum Merlin-Arthur (dQMA) protocol for certi-
fying equality between t binary strings (EQtn) of length n, and located at a radius-r set of
t terminals, using certificates of size O(tr2 logn) qubits, and messages of size O(tr2 log(n+r))
qubits.
It is worth mentioning that, although the dependence in r and t is polynomial, the de-
pendence in the actual size n of the instance remains logarithmic, which is our main concern.
Indeed, for applications such as the aforementioned distributed data storage motivating the
distant EQtn problem, it is expected that both the number t of replicas, and the maximum
distance between the nodes storing these replicas to be of several orders of magnitude smaller
than the size n of the stored replicated data.
It is also important to note that our protocol satisfies the basic requirement of reusability,
as one aims for protocols enabling regular and frequent verifications that the data are not
corrupted. Specifically, the quantum operations performed on the certificates during the
local verification phase operated between neighboring nodes preserve the quantum nature of
these certificates. That is, if EQtn is satisfied, i.e., if all the replicas xi’s are equal, then, up
to an elementary local relocation of the quantum certificates, these certificates are available
for a next test. If EQtn is not satisfied, i.e., if there exists a pair of replicas xi 6= xj , then the
certificates do not need to be preserved as this scenario corresponds to the case where the
correctness of the data structure is violated, requiring the activation of recovery procedures
for fixing the bug, and reassigning certificates to the nodes.
Finally, observe that our logarithmic upper bound for dQMA protocols is in contrast to
the linear lower bound that can be shown for classical dMA protocols even for t = 2 on a
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path of 4 nodes (see precise statement and proof in Appendix A). Our results thus show
that quantum certification mechanism can provide an exponential advantages over classical
certification mechanisms.
1.2 Related Work
The concept of distributed proof is present in the framework of distributed network com-
puting since the early work on fault-tolerance (see, e.g., [2, 5, 22])). Proof-labeling schemes
have been introduced in [31], and variants have been studied in [20, 16]. Randomized proof-
labeling schemes have been studied in [18]. Extensions of distributed proofs to a hierarchy
of decision mechanisms have studied in [15] and [6]. Frameworks like Cloud computing re-
cently enabled envisioning systems in which the nodes of the network could interact with a
third party. This led to the concept of distributed interactive proofs [30]. In this context,
each node can interact with an oracle who has a complete view of the system, is computa-
tionally unbounded, but is not trustable. For instance, in Arthur-Merlin (dAM) protocols,
the nodes start by querying the oracle Merlin, which provides them with answers in their
certificates. There is a simple classical compact dAM protocol for distant EQ, where the two
players stand at the extremities of a path (see Section 3). Nevertheless, although distributed
Arthur-Merlin protocols provide an appealing framework for studying the power of interac-
tive proofs in the distributed setting, the practical implementation of such protocols remain
questionable, as whether or not an entity such as the Cloud could play the role of the oracle
Merlin is debatable. Instead, dMA as well as dQMA protocols do not necessarily require the
interaction with an external party, as the certificates can be forged by the nodes themselves
during a pre-processing phase. Yet, we refer to [12, 17, 35] for recent developments in the
framework of distributed interactive proofs.
After a few early works [7, 14, 19, 39] that shed light on the potential and limitations
of quantum distributed computing (see also [4, 10, 13] for general discussions), evidences of
the advantage of quantum distributed computing over classical distributed computing have
been obtained recently for three fundamental models of (synchronous fault-free) distributed
network computing: the CONGEST model [24, 33], the CONGEST-CLIQUE model [23] and
the LOCAL model [34]. The present paper adds to this list another important task for which
quantum distributed computing significantly outperforms classical distributed computing,
namely, distributed certification.
Note that while this paper is the first to study quantum Merlin-Arthur protocols in
a distributed computing framework, there are a number of prior works studying them in
communication complexity [38, 26, 27, 9]. In particular, quantum Merlin-Arthur protocols
are shown to improve some computational measure (say, the total length of the messages from
the prover to Alice, and of the messages between Alice and Bob) exponentially compared to
Merlin-Arthur protocols where the messages from the prover are classical [38, 27].
Our quantum protocol is based on the SWAP test [11], which is a basic tool in the theory
of quantum computation and quantum information. This test allows to check if a quantum
state is symmetric, and has several applications, such as estimating the inner product of two
states (e.g., [11, 8, 42]), checking whether a given state (or a reduced state of it) is pure or
entangled with the environment system (e.g., [1, 29, 21, 28]), and more. In this paper, we
use the SWAP test in yet another way: for checking if two of the reduced states of a given
state are close.
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2 Model and Definitions
Distributed verification on graphs. Let t ≥ 2, and let f : ({0, 1}n)t → {0, 1} be a function.
The aim of the nodes is to collectively decide whether f(x1, . . . , xt) = 1 or not, where
x1, . . . , xt are assigned to t nodes of a graph. Specifically, an instance of the problem f
is a t-tuple (x1, . . . , xt) ∈ {0, 1}n × · · · × {0, 1}n, a connected graph G = (V,E), and an
ordered sequence v1, . . . , vt of distinct nodes of G. The node vi is given xi as input, for i =
1, . . . , t. All the other nodes receive no inputs. We consider distributed Merlin-Arthur (dMA)
protocols for deciding whether f(x1, . . . , xt) = 1. That is, the non-trustable prover assigns
(or “sends”) certificates to the nodes, and then the nodes perform a 1-round randomized
verification algorithm, i.e., an algorithm consisting of exchanging (in a synchronous way)
information only between neighbors and performing individual computations at each node.
We say that a dMA protocol has completeness a and soundness b for a function f if the
following holds for every (x1, . . . , xt) ∈ {0, 1}n×· · ·×{0, 1}n, every connected graph G, and
every ordered sequence v1, . . . , vt of distinct nodes in G:
(completeness) if f(x1, . . . , xt) = 1, then the prover can assign certificates to the nodes
such that Pr[all nodes accept] ≥ a;
(soundness) if f(x1, . . . , xt) = 0, then, for every certificate assignment by the prover,
Pr[all nodes accept] ≤ b.
The completeness condition guarantees that, with probability at least a, all nodes are
agreeing that the system is in a “legal” state (specified by f(x1, . . . , xt) = 1). The soundness
condition guarantees that, with probability at least 1−b, at least one node will detect that the
system is in an “illegal” state (specified by f(x1, . . . , xt) = 0). A node detecting illegality of
the state can raise an alarm, or launch a recovery procedure. Protocols with completeness 1
are called 1-sided protocols, or protocols with perfect completeness. Similarly to prior works
on distributed verification, the certificate size of the protocol is measured as the maximum
size (over all the nodes of the network) of the certificate sent by the prover to one of the
nodes, and the message size of the protocol is measured as the maximum size (over all pairs of
adjacent nodes) of the message exchanged between two adjacent nodes. Specifically, we will
consider the multi-party version of the equality function, EQtn, which is the boolean-valued
function from ({0, 1}n)t such that EQtn(x1, . . . , xt) = 1 ⇐⇒ x1 = · · · = xt.
In this work, we extend the framework of dMA protocols, to consider also cases where
the certificates given to the nodes can contain qubits (although they may also contain
classical bits) and the nodes can exchange messages consisting of qubits. These will be
called distributed Quantum Merlin-Arthur (dQMA) protocols. All our quantum protocols
do not require any prior entanglement (or any shared randomized) between the nodes.
Remark. A special case of interest is when the graph G is a path v0, . . . , vr, r ≥ 1, where
the left-end node v0 has an n-bit string x as input, the right-end node vr has an n-bit string y
as input, and the intermediate nodes v1, . . . , vr−1 have no inputs. That is, t = 2. Given a
function f : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}n → {0, 1}, the aim of the nodes is to collectively decide whether
f(x, y) = 1 or not. This setting is very much related to communication complexity.
Classical two-party communication complexity. We refer to [32] for the basic concepts of
two-party communication complexity. In this paper we will only consider two-party one-
way communication complexity. In this model two parties, denoted Alice and Bob, each
receives an input x ∈ {0, 1}n and y ∈ {0, 1}n, respectively. The goal is for Bob to output
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the value f(x, y) for some known Boolean function f : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}. Only
Alice can send a message to Bob. The one-way two-sided-error communication complexity
of f is the minimum number of bits that have to be sent on the worst input in a protocol
that outputs the correct answer with probability at least 2/3. The one-way one-sided-error
communication complexity of f is the minimum number of bits that have to be sent on the
worst input in a protocol that outputs the correct answer with probability 1 on any 1-input,
and outputs the correct answer with probability at least 2/3 on any 0-input.
We shall especially consider the following two functions. The equality function EQn is
defined as EQn(x, y) = 1 when x = y and EQn(x, y) = 0 otherwise, for any x, y ∈ {0, 1}n.
Its one-way one-sided-error communication complexity is O(log n) — see, e.g., [32]. For
any integer d ≥ 0, the Hamming distance function HAMdn is defined as follows: for any
x, y ∈ {0, 1}n, HAMdn(x, y) = 1 if the Hamming distance between x and y is at most d, and
HAMdn(x, y) = 0 otherwise. It is known [42] that, for d constant, the one-way two-sided-error
communication complexity of HAMdn is O(log n).
For any Boolean function f : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}, a set S ⊆ {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n is a
1-fooling set for f if, on the one hand, for every (x, y) ∈ S, f(x, y) = 1, and, on the other
hand, for every two pairs (x1, y1) 6= (x2, y2) in S × S, f(x1, y2) = 0 or f(x2, y1) = 0.
Quantum two-party communication complexity. We assume the reader is familiar with
the basics of quantum computation, in particular the notion of qubits, Dirac notation such
as |ψ〉 and 〈ψ| := (|ψ〉)†, and the quantum circuit model (see Sections 2 and 4 in Ref. [36],
for instance). In Appendix B we present more advanced concepts such as mixed states that
will be used in some of our proofs.
Quantum two-party communication complexity, first introduced by Yao [41], is defined
similarly to the classical version. The only difference is that the players are allowed to
exchange qubits instead of bits (the cost of a quantum protocol is the number of qubits
sent by the protocol). Note that since quantum protocols can trivially simulate classical
protocols, the quantum communication complexity of a function is never larger than its
classical communication complexity. More precisely, an m-qubit one-way quantum protocol
pi for the function f can be described in its most general form as follows. Alice prepares
an m-qubit (pure) quantum state |hx〉 and sends it to Bob.4 Bob then makes a measure-
ment on the state |hx〉, which gives an outcome b ∈ {0, 1}. Finally, Bob outputs b. Since
Bob’s measurement in the above description depends only on his input y, it can be math-
ematically described, for each y ∈ {0, 1}n, by two positive semi-definite matrices My,0 and
My,1 such that My,0 +My,1 = I. This pair {My,0,My,1} is called a POVM measurement
(POVM measurements are the most general form of measurements allowed by quantum
mechanics). If |hx〉 is measured by the POVM {My,0,My,1}, the probability that b = 0 is
tr(My,0(|hx〉〈hx|)), while the probability that b = 1 is tr(My,1(|hx〉〈hx|)).
3 General Overview of our Techniques
Let us provide an intuition of our protocol in the case of EQ2n over a path v0, . . . , vr of length
r ≥ 1 in which the terminals are the two nodes v0 and vr (that we rename Alice and Bob,
for convenience). Let us call x and y the n-bit strings owned by Alice and Bob, respectively.
4 Without loss of generality, we assume that Alice does not use any mixed state (i.e., a probability distri-
bution on pure states) in her message, as she can simulate it using a pure state called the purification [36]
whose length is at most twice the one of the mixed state.
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There is a simple classical dAM protocol for distant equality. In this protocol, Alice picks
a hash function h at random in an appropriate family of hash functions (i.e., a family such
that both h and h(x) can be encoded using O(log n) bits and such that the probability that
h(x) 6= h(y) is high when x 6= y). Merlin provides every node with (h, h(x)), and Bob checks
whether h(x) = h(y). Obviously, one cannot switch the order of Arthur and Merlin, as
letting Merlin choose the hash function would enable him to fool Arthur on illegal instances
by picking h that hashes identically the distinct input strings x and y. The main idea of our
dQMA protocol is to ask Merlin to provide the nodes with a quantum certificate consisting
of the quantum superposition of all the possible hashes.
Entering slightly more into the details, for any x ∈ {0, 1}n we consider the quantum
fingerprint |hx〉 = 1√K
∑
h |h〉|h(x)〉, where the sum is over all the hash functions, and 1√K is
the normalization factor of the quantum state. By using the same family of hash functions
as in the aforementioned dAM protocol, these fingerprints can be constructed in such a way
that their length is O(log n) qubits, and |hx〉 and |hy〉 are very far (more precisely, almost
orthogonal) when x 6= y. Checking whether the two quantum fingerprints |hx〉 and |hy〉
are either equal or far apart can be achieved by a quantum test called the SWAP test [11].
Formally, the probability that the SWAP test accepts is 1/2 + |〈hx|hy〉|2/2, where 〈hx|hy〉
denotes the inner product between the two quantum states |hx〉 and |hy〉.
Let us now describe the outline of our dQMA protocol. In the protocol each intermediate
node v1, . . . , vr−1 expects to receive the quantum fingerprint |hx〉. Alice, who does not receive
any certificate, creates by herself the fingerprint |hx〉, which depends only on x. Similarly,
Bob creates by himself the fingerprint |hy〉. The checking procedure simply checks whether
all these (r + 1) fingerprints are equal. This is done by applying the SWAP test to check
whether the fingerprints owned by adjacent nodes are equal or not. There are however a
few subtleties. In particular, since our analysis crucially requires that the SWAP tests do
not overlap, for each node we need to decide whether it will perform the SWAP test with
its right neighbor or its left neighbor. We do it in a randomized way and deal carefully with
the conflicting choices that appear. For the case x = y all the SWAP tests then succeed
with probability 1 and thus all the nodes accept.
For the case x 6= y, let us provide some intuition about why a prover cannot fool the
nodes for convincing them to all accept. To simplify the description we assume below that
|hx〉 and |hy〉 are orthogonal (instead of only almost orthogonal). If the prover was forced
to send certificates restricted to product states of the form |g1〉 ⊗ |g2〉 ⊗ · · · |gr−1〉 where |gj〉
is the state to the jth node, then a fairly straightforward argument would guarantee that,
with large probability, at least one node rejects. Indeed, under the product states restriction,
intuitively the best strategy for the prover to cheat is to send states “intermediate” between
|hx〉 and |hy〉, namely, to send the state |gj〉 = cos(pij/2r)|hx〉 + sin(pij/2r)|hy〉 to node vj
for each j ∈ {1, . . . , r−1}. Then, the probability that all nodes accept when performing the
SWAP tests would be roughly
∏r−1
j=1(1/2+ |〈gj|gj+1〉|2/2) = 1−Ω(1/r). The cheating prover
could then be caught with probability Ω(1/r), and this probability can be amplified to Ω(1)
by asking the prover to send several copies of the certificates (amplification is possible since
our protocol has perfect completeness).
The formal analysis of the protocol however faces several difficulties, which are mostly
due to the nature of quantum computation, and are especially challenging to handle in the
framework of distributed computation. For instance, quantum states cannot be duplicated
(the “no-cloning Theorem”), which implies that a same quantum state cannot be used
for parallel tests. Additionally, even sequential tests face the difficulty that the first test
may collapse the quantum state, making the second test impossible to perform (or at least
P. Fraigniaud, F. Le Gall, H. Nishimura and A. Paz XX:7
significantly complicating the analysis of the second test). Thus node vi cannot perform the
SWAP test with its two neighbors vi−1 and vi+1 simultaneously and (as already mentioned)
we have to design carefully the protocol so that the SWAP test do not overlap. A second, and
much more problematic issue is that the non-trustable Merlin can send arbitrary certificates
to the nodes for fooling them. In particular it is not bounded to send certificates that are
product states. A priori, it may seem that the SWAP test is not strong enough to handle
fooling strategies beyond product states. In this work we show that the SWAP can actually
detect such fooling strategies.
Specifically, our approach consists in considering the so-called reduced states, and to
establish the following property of the SWAP test (cf. Lemma 5 in Section 4). If the SWAP
test accepts with high probability when applied on the part of any two adjacent nodes in
a (possibly non-product) global quantum state resulting from the certificates, then the two
reduced states of that part (which is a bipartite state) must be close. As the two states |hx〉
and |hy〉 are very far apart when x 6= y, we can thus use this result to show that there is a
good probability that the SWAP test rejects at some node. Moreover, using reduced states
allows us to overcome other technical difficulties in the analysis of the (non-overlapping)
SWAP tests we consider. Indeed, some form of average-case success probability of all the
SWAP tests can be considered, instead of having to argue about the probability that all the
SWAP tests individually accept.
4 Quantum Distributed Proofs on Paths
In this section we restrict ourselves to the case of a path v0, . . . , vr of length r ≥ 1, in which
only the two extremities v0 and vr are given inputs. This framework allows us to elaborate
our main technique, that will be extended to arbitrary graphs in Section 5. Let x ∈ {0, 1}n
be the input to v0, and y ∈ {0, 1}n be the input to vr. Our goal is to design a dQMA protocol
to decide whether f(x, y) = 1 or not, for some given Boolean function on {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n.
We show the following general theorem that converts a one-way quantum communication
complexity protocol into a quantum Merlin-Arthur protocol for the corresponding long-
distance problem on the path. This theorem applies not only to one-sided-error protocols,
but also to the two-sided-error case (with a logarithmic additional factor in the complexity).
◮ Theorem 1. Let f : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1} be a Boolean function.
If f has a quantum one-way one-sided-error communication protocol transmitting at most
q qubits, then there exists a 1-sided quantum Merlin-Arthur protocol for f on the path
of length r, with soundness 1/3, using certificates of size O(r2q) qubits, and exchanging
messages of length O(r2(q + log r)) qubits.
If f has a quantum one-way two-sided-error communication protocol transmitting at most
q qubits, then, for any constant c, there exists a quantum Merlin-Arthur protocol for f
on the path of length r with completeness 1 − 1/nc, soundness 1/3, using certificates of
size O(r2q log(n+r)) qubits, and exchanging messages of length O(r2q log(n+r)) qubits.
Using known results (cf. Section 2) about one-way communication complexities of EQn
and HAMdn, the following two results are direct applications of Theorem 1.
◮ Corollary 2. There exists a 1-sided quantum Merlin-Arthur protocol for EQn in the path
of length r with soundness 1/3, using certificates of size O(r2 logn) qubits, and exchanging
messages of length O(r2 log(n+ r)) qubits.
◮ Corollary 3. For any c > 0 and d > 0, there exists a quantum Merlin-Arthur protocol for
HAM
d
n in the path of length r with completeness 1−1/nc, soundness 1/3, using certificates of
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length O(r2(logn) log(n+ r)) qubits, and exchanging messages of length O(r2(logn) log(n+
r)) qubits.
The goal of the remaining of this section is to prove Theorem 1. Let us first give an
overview of the proof. In our dQMA protocol in the path, the verification algorithm per-
formed by the nodes on the line is merely a simulation of a two-party one-way quantum com-
munication complexity protocol pi between Alice and Bob for the function f(x, y), with the
help of certificates provided by the prover. Specifically, every intermediate node v1, . . . , vr−1
expects to receive the quantum state sent by Alice to Bob in pi, as certificate. Let us denote
by |hx〉 this state, which depends on x. The right-end node vr simulates the two-party
protocol pi using |hx〉 received from the left neighbor vr−1, and applying Bob’s measurement
(i.e., the POVM measurement). If f(x, y) = 1, the prover honestly sends the desired state,
and vr accepts as it does receive |hx〉. However, if f(x, y) = 0, then the malicious prover
does not necessarily send a desired state. To catch the potentially malicious behavior of
the prover on “illegal” instances (i.e., those for which f(x, y) = 0), each intermediate node
checks whether its local proof is “close to” the one of its right neighbor. This is performed
by an application of the SWAP test.
Section 4.1 below describes in more detail how to construct the distributed quantum
Merlin-Arthur protocol, denoted Ppi, from an arbitrary one-way quantum communication
protocol pi for the function f . Section 4.2 analyzes the completeness and the soundness of
the protocol Ppi. Finally, Section 4.3 shows how to improve the soundness using “parallel
repetitions” and how to apply this analysis to prove Theorem 1.
4.1 A dQMA Protocol for the Path
Let ε ≥ 0 be a constant, which will be fixed small enough later in the proof. Let pi be a
quantum one-way communication protocol for f transmitting at most q qubits, such that,
for every input pair (x, y), if f(x, y) = 1 then pi outputs 1 with probability at least 1−ε, and
if f(x, y) = 0 then pi outputs 0 with probability at least 2/3. Let |hx〉 be the q-qubit (pure)
state sent from Alice to Bob, and let {My,1,My,0} be the POVM measurement performed
by Bob on |hx〉, where My,1 corresponds to the measurement result 1 (accept) and My,0 to
the measurement result 0 (reject). Our quantum Merlin-Arthur protocol Ppi is as follows.
Protocol Ppi for function f on input pair (x, y) in path v0, . . . , vr:
1. If f(x, y) = 1 then the prover sends the quantum register Rj that has a state
|hx〉 (or |hx〉〈hx| as the mixed state representation) as certificate to each of the
intermediate nodes vj , j ∈ {1, . . . , r − 1}.
2. The left-end node v0 prepares the state ρ0 = |hx〉〈hx| in quantum register R0.
3. For every j = 0, . . . , r − 1, the node vj chooses a bit bj uniformly at random, and
sends its quantum register Rj to the right neighbor vj+1 whenever bj = 0.
4. For every j = 1, . . . , r − 1, if vj receives a quantum register from its left neighbor
vj−1, and if bj = 1, then vj performs the SWAP test on the registers (Rj−1, Rj),
and accepts or rejects accordingly; Otherwise, vj accepts.
5. If the right-end node vr receives a quantum register Rr−1 from its left neigh-
bor, then vr performs the POVM measurement {My,1,My,0} corresponding to pi
applied to the state in Rr−1, and accepts or rejects accordingly; Otherwise, vr
accepts.
In the above protocol Ppi, the size of the quantum certificate that each node receives
from the prover is at most q, and the length of the quantum message that each node sends
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to the neighbor is also at most q. In the next subsection, we prove that the above protocol
has completeness 1− ε/2 and soundness 1− 1/42r2.
4.2 Analysis of Protocol P
pi
For the analysis, we recall the SWAP test. The test is a protocol with a given input state
on H = H1 ⊗ H2, where H1 and H2 are complex Euclidian spaces. Here, we consider H1
and H2 as quantum registers R1 and R2.
SWAP test on a pure state |ψ〉 on H, which is given in registers
(R1, R2).
1. Prepare the single-qubit state |+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉) in register R0.
2. If the content of R0 is 1, then apply the swap operator S on the state
|ψ〉 in registers (R1, R2), where S is defined by S(|j1〉|j2〉) = |j2〉|j1〉
(namely, S swaps register R1 and register R2).
3. Apply the Hadamard operatorH = 1√
2
(
1 1
1 −1
)
on the state in register
R0, and measure the content in the standard basis. Accept if the
content is 0, and reject otherwise.
Completeness. The following lemma is a direct consequence of the definition of the SWAP
test (see the proof in Appendix C). Here, HS is the symmetric subspace in H (namely,
the subspace spanned by the states invariant by the swap operator S, or equivalently, the
eigenstates of S with eigenvalue 1), and HA is the anti-symmetric subspace in H (namely,
the subspace spanned by the eigenstates of S with eigenvalue −1). Note that any state in
H is represented as the superposition of a state in HS (symmetric state) and a state in HA
(anti-symmetric state).
◮ Lemma 4. Assume that |ψ〉 = α|ψS〉 + β|ψA〉 where |ψS〉 ∈ HS and |ψA〉 ∈ HA. Then,
the SWAP test on input |ψ〉 accepts with probability |α|2.
For completeness, assume f(x, y) = 1. The prover then sends |hx〉 to all the intermediate
nodes. Then, all the nodes except the right-end node have |hx〉. By Lemma 4, all the SWAP
tests done in Step 4 are accepted with probability 1 (note that |hx〉 ⊗ |hx〉 is a symmetric
state). Furthermore, the right-end node accepts with probability at least 1/2 + (1− ε)/2 =
1− ε/2.
Soundness. The following lemma is our crucial property of the SWAP test, for checking
whether the two reduced states are close. Here, a reduced state intuitively represents the
local information on its own quantum system, by disregarding the outside systems. Note
that the trace distance between two quantum states ρ and σ is characterized as dist(ρ, σ) =
maxM tr(M(ρ−σ)), where the maximization is taken over all positive semi-definite matrices
M such that M ≤ I.
◮ Lemma 5. Let z ≥ 1, and assume that the SWAP test on input ρ in the input register
(R1, R2) accepts with probability 1 − 1/z. Then, dist(ρ1, ρ2) ≤ 2/
√
z + 1/z, where ρj is the
reduced state on Rj of ρ. Moreover, if the SWAP test on input ρ accepts with probability 1,
then ρ1 = ρ2 (and hence dist(ρ1, ρ2) = 0).
The proof can be found in Appendix D. For soundness, let (x, y) such that any pair such
that f(x, y) = 0. The proof of the following simple lemma, which crucially uses Lemma 5,
can be found in Appendix E.
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◮ Lemma 6. For every j ∈ {1, . . . , r}, let Fj be the event that vj performs the local test
(SWAP or POVM) in Protocol Ppi, and let Ej be the event that this local test rejects. Then
we have
∑r
j=1 Pr[Ej |Fj ] ≥ 121r .
In Steps 4 and 5, node vj , 1 ≤ j ≤ r, performs the local test (SWAP or POVM) with
probability at least 1/4 (more precisely, vj , 1 ≤ j ≤ r − 1, performs the SWAP test with
probability 1/4 and vr performs the POVM with probability 1/2). It follows that, for every
j ∈ {1, . . . , r}, the event Fj occurs in at least (1/4) × 2r outcomes of all the 2r possible
outcomes b0 · · · br−1 that can be obtained in Step 3. Here, we consider any fixed outcomes
b0 · · · br−1 that induce k events Fj1 , Fj2 , . . . , Fjk with k 6= 0 where we note that 0 ≤ k ≤ ⌊r/2⌋
in general. The probability that some node rejects in Steps 4 or 5 under this outcome is
Pr[∨ki=1Eji | ∧ki=1 Fji ] ≥
1
⌊r/2⌋
k∑
i=1
Pr[Eji | ∧ki=1 Fji ] =
1
⌊r/2⌋
k∑
i=1
Pr[Eji |Fji ],
where the inequality comes from Lemma 13 in Appendix F, and the equality comes from
the fact that each of Fji and Eji is independent from all the other event Fji′ with i
′ 6= i
(in particular, Fj−1 and Fj never occur at the same time). As each outcome occurs with
probability 1/2r, the probability that some node rejects in Steps 4 or 5 is at least
1
2r
· [(1/4) · 2r] · 1⌊r/2⌋
r∑
j=1
Pr[Ej |Fj ] ≥ 1
2r
r∑
j=1
Pr[Ej |Fj ] ≥ 1
2r
· 1
21r
=
1
42r2
,
where the second last inequality comes from Lemma 6.
4.3 Proof of Theorem 1
So far, we have shown that the protocol Ppi has a completeness parameter very close to
1, but poor soundness. To establish Theorem 1, we need to improve soundness without
degrading the completeness too much. This is achieved via a form of parallel repetition of
Ppi, by taking the logical conjunction of the outputs obtained by repetitions. The protocol
resulting from k repetitions of Ppi is denoted by Ppi[k]. Its formal presentation can be found
in Appendix G.
Protocol Ppi[k] has completeness (1 − ε/2)k, that is, the completeness has not reduced
much whenever ε is small. By a similar analysis of standard amplification for quantum
Merlin-Arthur games as the analysis in [3, 25], one can show that Ppi[k] has soundness
(1−1/42r2)k. By choosing k = 84r2, the resulting protocol Ppi[k] has completeness 1−42r2ε
and soundness (1/e)2 < 1/3, while the size of the certificates is O(r2q) qubits, and the length
of the message exchanged between neighbors is O(r2(q + log r)) (where the additional term
log r comes from the index to the right neighbor in Step 3 of Ppi[k]).
Theorem 1 can now be easily derived from the above analysis. For the first part of the
theorem, where f is having a one-sided-error one-way protocol pi, simply use the protocol
Ppi from Section 4.1 with ε = 0. The result then follows from the analysis of Section 4.2 and
from the above discussion about soundness reduction.
For the case of second part of the theorem, where f is having a two-sided-error one-way
protocol, we repeat the protocol pi for O(log(n + r)) times and using majority voting to
get a protocol that correctly computes the value of the function with probability at least
1 − 1/42ncr2. The protocol pi of Section 4.1 can thus be chosen with ε = 1/42ncr2, with
message size O(q log(n+ r)). The result then follows similarly. ◭
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5 Certifying Equality in General Graphs
We now extend our protocol for checking equality between n-bit strings x1, . . . , xt stored at
t ≥ 2 distinct nodes u1, . . . , ut of a connected simple graph G. We first show how to reduce
the problem to trees of a specific structure, and then present a protocol for trees.
5.1 Reduction to Trees
Let G = (V,E) be a connected simple graph, and let u1, . . . , ut be t ≥ 2 distinct nodes of G.
Assume, without loss of generality, that u1 is the most central node among them, i.e., it satis-
fies maxi=1,...,t distG(u1, ui) = minj=1,...,tmaxi=1,...,t distG(uj, ui). Let r = maxi=1,...,t distG(u1, ui)
be the radius of the t terminals u1, . . . , ut. We now construct a tree T rooted at u1, that has
all other terminals as leaves, maximum degree t and depth at most r + 1. To this end, we
start from a BFS tree T ′ in G, rooted at u1. We then truncate the tree at each terminal ui
that does not have any terminal as successors, thus limiting the depth to r and the degree
to t. For every terminal ui that is not a leaf, including u1, we replace ui with a node u
′
i, and
connect ui to u
′
i as a leaf, where the input xi stays at ui — this guarantees that all inputs
are now on leaves, same degree bound, and depth at most one more.
◮ Lemma 7. For t terminals with radius r, there is a tree T with depth at most r + 1, and
maximum degree at most t, rooted at one terminal, such that all the terminals are located at
the t leaves of T .
While T is not a sub-tree of G, we can easily emulate an algorithm or a labeling scheme
designed for T , in G (specifically, in T ′). To this end, every internal terminal ui in T ′
simulates the behavior of ui itself, and also of u
′
i. The following lemma is using classi-
cal assumptions of network computing (see, e.g., [37]) and can be proved using standard
techniques (see, e.g., [31]). We refer to the tree T in Lemma 7.
◮ Lemma 8. For any graph G = (V,E) with nodes IDs taken in a range polynomial in |V |,
there is a proof-labeling scheme for the tree T using certificates on O(log |V |) bits.
Roughly speaking, each non-tree node will have a (non-quantum) label indicating its
distance from the tree, and each tree node will have as label its depth in the tree, the ID of
its parent, and the ID of the root.
5.2 Certifying Equality in Trees
Based on Lemmas 7 and 8, we can restrict our attention to the case in which the t terminals
u1, . . . , ut, who hold the n-bit strings x1, . . . , xt, belong to a tree T rooted at u1, of depth
equal to r+1, where r is the radius of the terminals, with maximum degree t, and with leaves
u2, . . . , ut. Moreover, the root u1 itself is of degree 1. We present a distributed quantum
Merlin-Arthur protocol for the equality function EQtn in this setting, and hence prove our
main result.
◮ Theorem 9. There is a one-round distributed quantum Merlin-Arthur protocol on T for
EQ
t
n between t terminals of radius r, with perfect completeness, soundness 1/3, certificate
size O(t r2 logn) qubits, and message length O(t r2 log(n+ r)) qubits.
Proof. Let pi be a one-way communication protocol for EQn transmittingm = O(log n) qubits
such that, for every input pair (x, y), if x = y then pi outputs 1 with probability 1 and if
x 6= y then pi outputs 0 with probability at least 2/3 (such a protocol exists, as mentioned in
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Section 2). For input (x, y), let |hx〉 be the quantum message from Alice to Bob in pi, and let
{My,1,My,0} be the POVM measurement done by Bob on |hx〉 in pi, whereMy,1 corresponds
to the measurement result 1 (accept), and My,0 corresponds to the measurement result 0
(reject), respectively. Our quantum Merlin-Arthur protocol is as follows.
Protocol P(EQtn) for equality in trees
1. If EQtn(x1, . . . , xt) = 1 then the prover sends an m-qubit state equal to |hx1〉 to
each of the nodes v that have no input.
2. For every i ∈ {1, . . . , t}, node ui prepares the m-qubit state |hxi〉.
3. Every non-root node v of the tree chooses a bit bv uniformly at random. If bv = 0,
then v sends its m-qubit state to its parent in T .
4. For every non-terminal node v, if v receives a state from the children, and if bv = 1,
then v performs the SWAP test on the 2m-qubit state that consists of the m-qubit
state received from the prover and an m-qubit state received from the children,
which is chosen uniformly at random if he/she receives multiple m-qubit states
from the children, and accepts or rejects accordingly. Otherwise, v accepts.
5. If the root node u1 receives a state from its children, then u1 performs the POVM
measurement {Mx1,1,Mx1,0} on anm-qubit state received from the children, which
is chosen uniformly at random if he/she receives multiple m-qubit states from the
children, and accepts or rejects accordingly. Otherwise, u1 accepts.
The perfect completeness trivially holds since every local test yields acceptance with
certainty. For soundness, if EQtn(x1, . . . , xt) = 0 then there is a leaf ui, i > 1, holding
xi 6= x1. Then, we can perform almost the same analysis as in Section 4, but for the path
connecting u1 and ui in T . The only difference is the probability that each local test occurs;
it is at least 1/4 in the analysis of Ppi done in Section 4, while it is at least (1/4) × (1/t)
in the protocol P(EQtn) we are now considering, as every non-terminal node vj or u1 on the
path chooses the m-qubit state from the child on the path uniformly at random from the
multiple m-qubit states (possibly) sent from all the children. It follows that P(EQtn) has
soundness 1 − O(1/tr2). The proof is completed by performing O(tr2) parallel repetitions
of P(EQtn) for error reduction, in the same way one performed O(r2) parallel repetitions of
Ppi in Section 4. ◭
Remark. Using Lemma 8, we get that, up to adding O(log |V |) classical bits in the cer-
tificates of the nodes, Theorem 9 can be extended to the case where the terminals are in a
connected graph G = (V,E).
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we extended the notion of randomized proof-labeling scheme to the quantum
setting. We showed the efficiency of distributed quantum certification mechanisms by de-
signing a distributed quantum Merlin-Arthur protocol for EQtn between t parties spread out
in a graph, using certificates and messages whose size depend logarithmically on n, the size
of the data. This is in contrast to classic distributed Merlin-Arthur protocols, which require
certificates of size linear in n, independently from the message length. Our result has been
obtained by revisiting the SWAP test, and demonstrating that this test can be applied for
checking proximity properties between reduced states.
Which other Boolean predicates on labeled graphs, beyond equality, could take benefit
from quantum resources for the design of compact distributed certification schemes is an
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intriguing question. Theorem 1 gives a partial answer on the path. A complete answer to
this question would significantly help improving our comprehension of the power of quantum
computing in the distributed setting.
A P P E N D I X
A Classical Lower Bounds
In this section, we show that classical distributed Merlin-Arthur (dMA) protocols for distant
EQ require certificates of linear size. In fact, we establish a more general lower bound which
applies to all function f with large fooling set, even using shared randomness. For the lower
bound, it is sufficient to consider the path v0, . . . , vr in which v0 and vr are provided with
inputs x and y, respectively.
◮ Theorem 10. Let r ≥ 4, and let f(x, y) be any Boolean function with a 1-fooling set of
size at least k. Let P be a classical Merlin-Arthur protocol for f in the path of length r with
shared randomness, certificates of size ⌊ 1
2
log(k − 1)⌋ bits, and completeness 1− p. Then P
has soundness at least 1− 2p.
Proof. For every i = 0, 1, . . . , r, let wi(x, y) be the certificate provided to the ith node vi of
the path by the prover for inputs (x, y). Since f has large 1-fooling set, but small certificates,
for any index j ∈ {1, . . . , r − 2} there exist two distinct pairs of inputs (x1, y1) and (x2, y2)
with f(x1, y1) = f(x2, y2) = 1, and (w.l.o.g.) f(x1, y2) = 0 such that
wj(x1, y1) = wj(x2, y2) and wj+1(x1, y1) = wj+1(x2, y2). (1)
The output outi of every node vi is a function of its own certificate, the certificates of its one
or two neighbors, its identifier, and the public random string s. In addition, the outputs of
v0 and v1 (resp., vr and vr−1) may also depend on the input x to v0 (resp., the input y to vr).
We interpret the outputs as Booleans, where accept = true = 1, and reject = false = 0. Let
F =
∧
i≤j−1
outi, and F
′ =
∧
i≥j+2
outi,
Since P has completeness 1− p, the following inequality holds for every a ∈ {1, 2},
Pr
s
[
F (xa, ya) = 1 ∧ outj(xa, ya) = 1 ∧ outj+1(xa, ya) = 1 ∧ F ′(xa, ya) = 1
] ≥ 1− p.
This implies that{
Prs
[
F (x1, y1) = 1 ∧ outj(x1, y1) = 1
] ≥ 1− p ;
Prs
[
outj+1(x2, y2) = 1 ∧ F ′(x2, y2) = 1
] ≥ 1− p .
By the union bound,
Pr
s
[
F (x1, y1) = 1 ∧ outj(x1, y1) = 1 ∧ outj+1(x2, y2) = 1 ∧ F ′(x2, y2) = 1
]
≥ 1− Pr
s
[¬(F (x1, y1) = 1 ∧ outj(x1, y1) = 1)]− Pr
s
[¬(outj+1(x2, y2) = 1 ∧ F ′(x2, y2) = 1)]
≥ 1− 2p.
Noting Eqs. (1), this latter inequality means that there exist some certificates that the prover
can assign to the nodes for convincing them to all accept, with probability at least 1− 2p,
on a pair (x1, y2) of inputs such that f(x1, y2) = 0. ◭
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Since EQn has a 1-fooling set of size 2
n, the corollary below follows directly from Theo-
rem 10.
◮ Corollary 11. For every r ≥ 4, every distributed (classical) Merlin-Arthur protocol for EQ2n
in the path of length r with certificates of size at most ⌊(n − 1)/2⌋ bits, and completeness
1− p has soundness at least 1− 2p.
The requirements for a good protocol is to have a high completeness (i.e., small value
for p, ideally p = 0) and a reasonably small soundness. Corollary 11 precisely shows that for
the equality function such protocols cannot exist in the classical setting unless the certificate
size is linear in n.
Remark. The completeness-soundness gap of Theorem 10 is optimal in general, in the sense
that it cannot be improved for EQ21, i.e., distant equality between two input bits. Consider
the following protocol P for EQ21, on input (x, y) ∈ {0, 1} × {0, 1}. It uses a shared random
variable X ∈ {−1, 0, 1} with Pr[X = 0] = Pr[X = 1] = p, and Pr[X = −1] = 1 − 2p. In
the case X = −1, all the nodes accept. In the case X ∈ {0, 1}, v0 accepts whenever X = x,
vr accepts whenever X = y, and all the other nodes accept. If x = y, the probability that all
the nodes accept is 1− 2p+(1/2) · (2p) = 1− p. If x 6= y, then either v0 or vr systematically
rejects for X 6= −1, and thus the probability that all the nodes accept is 1− 2p.
B Quantum Fundamentals
Here we summarize some notation and properties that are used in this paper. As a termi-
nology, we sometime identify physical concepts (such as pure states) and their mathematical
representations (such as vectors).
A mixed state on a complex Euclidian space H is considered as a representation of a
probability distribution of pure quantum states (represented like |ψ〉 as vectors on H). If
the quantum state in H is a pure state |ψj〉 with probability pj, its mixed state is represented
as the positive semi-definite matrix σ =
∑
j pj |ψj〉〈ψj | (the symbol ρ or σ is often used for
representing a mixed state). In particular, a (pure) quantum state |ψ〉 is written as the
projector |ψ〉〈ψ| of rank 1. If this state evolves by a unitary operation U , the state changes
into UσU † =
∑
j U |ψj〉〈ψj |U †. We call a mixed state simply a (quantum) state (as far as
we do not care about the difference between pure and mixed states).
For any complex Euclidian spaces HA and HB and any matrix M on HA ⊗ HB, the
reduced matrix on HA obtained by tracing out on HB, denoted as trB(M) is
trB(M) =
∑
j
(I ⊗ 〈j|)M(I ⊗ |j〉),
where {|j〉} is the standard basis in HB (in fact, it may be any orthonormal basis). If M
represents a mixed state σ, trB(σ) is called the reduced state on HA, which represents the
locally visible state on HA of σ obtained by disregarding the part on HB of σ.
A POVM (positive operator valued measure) on a complex Euclidian space H represents
a general measurement on a quantum state on H. In particular, a binary-valued POVM
(which we use in this paper) on H is a set {M0,M1} that consists of two positive semi-
definite matrices M0 and M1 on H such that M0 +M1 = I. If a mixed state ρ is measured
by {M0,M1}, the probability that the outcome with Mj (j = 0, 1) is obtained is tr(Mjρ).
For any matrix M on complex Euclidian space H, the trace norm of M is defined as
‖A‖tr = tr(
√
M †M).
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For any two mixed states ρ and σ in H, the trace distance between ρ and σ is defined as
dist(ρ, σ) =
1
2
‖ρ− σ‖tr,
which satisfies that 0 ≤ dist(ρ, σ) ≤ 1 (as dist(ρ, σ) becomes close to 0, ρ and σ become
close). In particular, for any pure states |ψ〉, |φ〉, it holds that
dist(|ψ〉〈ψ|, |φ〉〈φ|) =
√
1− |〈ψ|φ〉|2.
An important characterization of the trace distance is
dist(ρ, σ) = max
M
tr(M(ρ− σ)),
where the maximization is taken over all positive semi-definite matricesM such thatM ≤ I.
This characterization means that dist(ρ, σ) is equal to the difference between the probability
that the “best” POVM measurement {M, I−M}, for distinguishing ρ and σ, on the state ρ
gives the outcome with the POVM element M , tr(Mρ), and the probability that the same
POVM measurement on σ gives the outcome with M , tr(Mσ).
For any two mixed states ρ and σ in H, the fidelity between ρ and σ, denoted as F (ρ, σ),
is another measure of their closeness, and it holds that 0 ≤ F (ρ, σ) ≤ 1 (as F (ρ, σ) becomes
close to 1, ρ and σ become close). For this measure, we need only the following equality,
which is found in Ref. [40] for instance.
◮ Lemma 12 (Corollary 3.23 in Ref. [40]). Let |ψ〉 and |φ〉 be two pure states on H⊗H′ for
complex Euclidian spaces H and H′. It holds that
F (trH′(|ψ〉〈ψ|), trH′(|φ〉〈φ|)) = ‖ trH(|φ〉〈ψ|)‖tr.
Let H1 and H2 be two complex Euclidian spaces consisting of m qubits for each (namely,
each of the space has the standard basis states {|x〉 | x ∈ {0, 1}m}). Then, H = H1⊗H2 can
be written as the direct sum of the symmetric space HS and the antisymmetric subspace
HA, Here, the symmetric space HS is the subspace of H spanned by the states |ψ〉 in H
such that S|ψ〉 = |ψ〉 where S is the SWAP operator defined by S(|j1〉|j2〉) = |j2〉|j1〉. The
antisymmetric subspace is the subspace |ψ〉 in H such that S|ψ〉 = −|ψ〉. Note that HA is
the orthogonal complement of HS . The dimensions of HS and HA are M(M + 1)/2 and
M(M − 1)/2, respectively, where M = 2m. See Ref. [40], for instance, for more information
on (bipartite as well as multipartite) symmetric states and anti-symmetric states.
C Proof of Lemma 4
Noting that S|ψS〉 = |ψS〉 and S|ψA〉 = −|ψA〉, the state after Step 2 is
1√
2
(|0〉|ψ〉+ |1〉S|ψ〉) = 1√
2
(α|0〉|ψS〉+ β|0〉|ψA〉+ α|0〉|ψS〉 − β|1〉|ψA〉)
=
1√
2
[|0〉(α|ψS〉+ β|ψA〉) + |1〉(α|ψS〉 − β|ψA〉)].
The final state obtained in Step 3 is
1√
2
[(H |0〉)(α|ψS〉+ β|ψA〉) + (H |1〉)(α|ψS〉 − β|ψA〉)]
=
1
2
[(|0〉+ |1〉)(α|ψS〉+ β|ψA〉) + (|0〉 − |1〉)(α|ψS〉 − β|ψA〉)]
= α|0〉|ψS〉+ β|1〉|ψA〉.
Thus, the probability that 0 is measured on R0 (and thus is accepted) is |α|2.
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D Proof of Lemma 5
First, we observe the second statement. By Lemma 4, if ρ includes some asymmetric state,
the SWAP test rejects with a non-zero probability. Hence, ρ must consist of only symmetric
states, which means that the two reduced states of ρ coincides.
In the remaining part, we prove the first statement. The mixed state ρ can be represented
as ρ =
∑
j pj |ψj〉〈ψj | (which means that the state is in a (pure) state |ψj〉 with probability
pj). Moreover, each |ψj〉 can be represented as a superposition of a symmetric state and
an antisymetric state, namely, |ψj〉 = αj |ψSj 〉 + βj |ψAj 〉 with some symmetric state |ψSj 〉
and some antisymmetric state |ψAj 〉, where |αj |2 + |βj |2 = 1. Then, by Lemma 4 and the
assumption,
∑
j pj |αj |2 ≥ 1− 1/z, and thus,
∑
j
pj |βj |2 ≤ 1
z
. (2)
The mixed state ρ is furthermore rewritten as
ρ =
∑
j
pj
(|αj |2|ψSj 〉〈ψSj |+ αjβ∗j |ψSj 〉〈ψAj |+ α∗jβ|ψAj 〉〈ψSj |+ |β|2|ψAj 〉〈ψAj |) , (3)
and the reduced state ρ3−i = tri(ρ) (i = 1, 2) on H3−i (obtained by tracing out on Hi) is
tri(ρ) =
∑
j
pj
(|αj |2 tri(|ψSj 〉〈ψSj |) + αjβ∗j tri(|ψSj 〉〈ψAj |)
+α∗jβ tri(|ψAj 〉〈ψSj |) + |βj |2 tri(|ψAj 〉〈ψAj |)
)
.
As tr1(|ψSj 〉〈ψSj |) = tr2(|ψSj 〉〈ψSj |) from the definition of the symmetric state,
tr1(ρ)− tr2(ρ)
=
∑
j
pj
(
αjβ
∗
j [tr1(ρ
sa
j )− tr2(ρsaj )] + α∗jβj [tr1(ρasj )− tr2(ρasj )] + |βj |2[tr1(ρaj )− tr2(ρaj )]
)
,
where ρsaj = |ψSj 〉〈ψAj |, ρasj = |ψAj 〉〈ψSj |, and ρaj = |ψAj 〉〈ψAj |. By the positive scalability and
the triangle inequality of the trace norm, ‖ tr1(ρ)− tr2(ρ)‖tr is at most∑
j
pj
(|αj ||βj |‖ tr1(ρsaj )− tr2(ρsaj )‖tr + |αj ||βj |‖ tr1(ρasj )− tr2(ρasj )‖tr
+|βj |2‖ tr1(ρaj )− tr2(ρaj )‖tr
)
.
As ρaj is a quantum state (with trace norm 1), we have
‖ tr1(ρaj )− tr2(ρaj )‖tr ≤ ‖ tr1(ρaj )‖tr + ‖ tr2(ρaj )‖tr = 1 + 1 ≤ 2.
On the contrary, we notice that ρsaj (or ρ
as
j ) is not a quantum state. However, by Lemma 12
and the fact that the fidelity between two quantum states is at most 1,
‖ tri(ρsaj )‖tr = ‖ tri(|ψSj 〉〈ψAj |)‖tr = F (tr3−i(|ψAj 〉〈ψAj |), tr3−i(|ψSj 〉〈ψSj |)) ≤ 1,
and thus,
‖ tr1(ρsaj )− tr2(ρsaj )‖tr ≤ 2.
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Similarly, we have ‖ tr1(ρasj )− tr2(ρasj )‖tr ≤ 2. Therefore,
‖ tr1(ρ)− tr2(ρ)‖tr ≤
∑
j
pj4|αj ||βj |+
∑
j
pj2|βj|2. (4)
By Eq. (2), the second term of the right-hand side is at most 2/z. By the Cauchy-Schwarz
inequality (and |αj | ≤ 1), the first term is at most
4
∑
j
√
pj
√
pj|βj | ≤ 4

∑
j
pj


1/2
∑
j
pj |βj |2


1/2
≤ 4
√
1
z
.
This induces that
dist(ρ1, ρ2) =
1
2
‖ tr2(ρ)− tr1(ρ)‖tr ≤ 1
z
+ 2
√
1
z
.
◭
E Proof of Lemma 6
Let αj = Pr[Ej |Fj ]. Then, for every j ∈ {1, . . . , r}, Pr[Ej |Fj ] = 1 − αj , where we note
that the complementary event Ej for j = 1, . . . , r − 1 is the event where the SWAP test on
the two q-qubit states ρj−1 and ρj accepts, and Er represents the event that the result of
the POVM measurement is 1 (accept), which corresponds to the POVM element My,1. By
Lemma 5, the trace distance dist between the reduced q-qubit states ρj−1 on vj−1 and ρj
on vj is
dist(ρj−1, ρj) ≤
{
2√
1/αj
+ 1
1/αj
if αj 6= 0
0 otherwise
Thus dist(ρj−1, ρj) ≤ 3√αj . Then, by the triangle inequality,
dist(ρ0, ρr−1) ≤
r−1∑
j=1
dist(ρj−1, ρj) ≤ 3
r−1∑
j=1
√
αj .
For Pr[Er |Fr], the soundness of pi promises that the probability that the test {My,1,My,0}
rejects ρ0 = |hx〉〈hx| is at least 2/3, i.e., tr(My,0ρ0) ≥ 2/3. Hence,
αr = Pr[Er |Fr] = tr(My,0ρr−1) ≥ 2
3
− dist(ρ0, ρr−1) ≥ 2
3
− 3
r−1∑
j=1
√
αj ,
where the first inequality comes from the characterization of dist on indistinguishability of
two states, that is, | tr(My,0ρ0)− tr(My,0ρr−1)| ≤ dist(ρ0, ρr−1). Thus, we have
3
r∑
j=1
√
αj ≥ αr + 3
r−1∑
j=1
√
αj ≥ 2
3
.
By the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality,
√
r
√√√√ r∑
j=1
αj ≥
r∑
j=1
√
αj ,
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and thus we have
r∑
j=1
αj ≥
(
2
9
√
r
)2
≥ 1
21r
.
◭
F Elementary Lemma on Probability
For any events A,B, we denote the complementary event of A by A or ¬A, the sum event
of A and B by A∨B, and the product event of A and B by A∧B. The following lemma is
basic on probability, while we give it with the proof for the self-containment.
◮ Lemma 13. Let Aj (j = 1, 2, . . . , n) be an event. Then, following holds.
Pr[A1 ∧A2 ∧ · · · ∧An] ≤ 1n
∑n
j=1 Pr[Aj ]
Pr[A1 ∨A2 ∨ · · · ∨An] ≥ 1n
∑n
j=1 Pr[Aj ]
Proof. We show the first item by induction. The base case trivially holds. Assume that the
case n− 1 holds. Then,
Pr[A1 ∧ · · · ∧An]
=
n− 1
n
Pr[A1 ∧ · · · ∧An−1] Pr[An|A1 ∧ · · · ∧An−1] + 1
n
Pr[An] Pr[A1 ∧ · · · ∧An−1|An]
≤ n− 1
n
Pr[A1 ∧ · · · ∧An−1] + 1
n
Pr[An]
≤ n− 1
n
· 1
n− 1
n−1∑
j=1
Pr[Aj ] +
1
n
Pr[An]
=
n∑
j=1
Pr[Aj ],
where the last inequality comes from the assumption. Thus, the case n holds, and the
induction is completed.
The second item is proved by
Pr[A1 ∨ · · · ∨An] = 1− Pr[A1 ∧ · · · ∧An]
≥ 1− 1
n
n∑
j=1
Pr[Aj ]
=
n∑
j=1
Pr[Aj ],
where the inequality comes from the first item. ◭
G Parallel Repetition of Protocol P
pi
in the Proof of Theorem 1
The description of the parallel repetition protocol Ppi[k] considered in Section 4.3 is as
follows.
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Protocol Ppi[k]: Soundness amplification of Protocol Ppi
1. If f(x, y) = 1 then the prover sends the k quantum registers Rj,i (i = 1, . . . , k),
each of which has a state |hx〉 as certificate, to each of the intermediate nodes vj ,
j ∈ {1, . . . , r − 1}.
2. The left-end node v0 prepares the k quantum registers R0,i, each of which has
|hx〉.
3. For every j = 0, . . . , r− 1, the node vj chooses a k-bit string bj,1 · · · bj,k uniformly
at random, and sends Rj,i, together with the index i, to its right neighbor vj+1
whenever bj,i = 0.
4. For every j = 1, . . . , r − 1 and for every i = 1, . . . , k, if the node vj receives an
index i, and if bj,i = 1, then vj performs the SWAP test on (Rj−1,i, Rj,i). Node vj
rejects whenever at least one of the performed SWAP tests rejects, and it accepts
otherwise.
5. If the right-end node vr receives an index i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, then it performs the
POVM measurement {My,1,My,0} corresponding to pi applied to the state in
Rr−1,i. Node vr rejects if at least one of the performed POVM measurements
rejects, and it accepts otherwise.
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